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FUTURE INTERESTS
HERMAN L. TRAUTMAN*
There were five cases in the field of Future Interests during the
period' covered by this Survey. They were all decided by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee. From the standpoint of doctrinal development,
Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church v. Wagner,2 involving the
relation of the possibility of reverter to the Rule against Perpetuities,
was probably the most significant, although the point determined had
perhaps been assumed previously in Tennessee.3 Pope v. Alexander4
drew a neat distinction between a trust for a "public" cemetery and a
trust for a "private" cemetery with respect to the Rule against Per-
petuities. A plausible suggestion is made which may be of interest and
perhaps of some amusement. Hutchison v. Board5 offered an easier
variation of that perfectly awful limitation "to A and his children." A
summary of the many Tennessee cases is attempted. And by far the
most difficult, in the light of previous Tennessee cases, are the complex
construction problems involved in Long v. Wood 6 and Third National
Bank v. Harrison.7 Considered at face value, these cases indicate a
surprising tendency to prefer a contingent construction over a vested
construction, which after all may be desirable in view of the federal
estate tax treatment of vested future interests.
Possibility of Reverter and Determinable Fee: In Mountain City
Missionary Baptist Church v. Wagner,8 the Supreme Court affirmed a
chancery decree which held that a deed to a church created a determin-
able fee in the church with its consequent possibility of reverter in
the grantor. The Court refused to hold that a possibility of reverter
is subject to the durational time limits of the Rule against Perpetuities.
The deed contained a clause providing that "it is ... understood that
if said property shall cease to be used by the Missionary Baptist
Church... as a place of worship ... said property shall revert back
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar. Grate-
ful acknowledgement is made of the helpful research assistance of Mr. James
C. Kirby, Jr., of Old Hickory, Tennessee, formerly a student at Vanderbilt Law
School and now a Root-Tilden Scholar at New York University.
1. This Survey is limited to those decisions of the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and those decisions of the federal
courts rendered in cases from Tennessee which were published between June 1,
1952, and June 1, 1953.
2. 249 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1952).
3. See Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925).
4. 250 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1952).
5. 250 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1952).
6. 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1953).
7. 256 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1953).
8. 249 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1952).
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to., . M. M. Wagner and his heirs.... ." This case presented the stock
factual situation and the typical limitation for the creation of both
the determinable fee and the possibility of reverter. These two are
frequently confused with a somewhat similar but quite distinct pair of
substantive concepts known as the fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent and its consequent right of entry for conditi~n broken.9
The right of entry for condition broken is called a "power of termina-
tion" by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of Property'O
because of two reasons. First, the fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent does not end automatically and by expiration like the de-
terminable fee; on the contrary, it is cut short, or divested, if, but only
if, the person having the "right of entry" chooses to exercise it. This
option is not a "right" as that term is defined in the Restatement of
Property; rather it is said to be a "power of termination.""1 Second,
under modern law, an entry is not necessary to terminate the interest
subject to the condition.
Is the possibility of reverter a vested or a contingent interest? If it
is vested, of course, the Rule against Perpetuities would have no ap-
plication.12 But can there be a vested interest following after the ex-
piration of this special type of fee simple -called a "fee simple de-
terminable"? For years Gray 13 denied the legality of the fee simple
determinable, asserting it to be a form of subinfeudation forbidden by
the Statute, Quia Emptores, but American courts in accord with the
instant case continued to recognize its validity.14 With logic, Gray
asserted that, if it is a valid interest, it must be a vested interest, be-
cause it is ready to take effect in possession automatically upon the
expiration of the prior estate.15
On the other hand, the event which determines the fee simple may
never happen. Therefore, the Restatement of Property defines a pos-
sibility of reverter as a reversionary interest subject to a condition
precedent.' 6 Indeed, the very fact that it is called a "possibility" sug-
9. Cf. Comford v. Cantrell, 177 Tenn. 553, 151 S.W.2d 1076 (1941); Atkin v.
Gillespie, 156 Tenn. 137, 299 S.W. 776 (1927); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151
Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925); Anderson v. Lucas, 140 Tenn. 336, 204 S.W. 989
(1918); Board of Education v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 39, 134 S.W. 863 (1911); Lums-
den v. Payne, 120 Tenn. 407, 114 S.W. 483 (1908). See 1 SIMEs, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS §§ 159, 160, 163, 177, 179, 180, 181, 186 (1936). But cf. Dunham, "Possi-
bility of Reverter and Powers of Termination - Fraternal or Identical Twins?"
20 U. or Cm. L. REv. 215 (1953).
10. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 24, comment b and special note, and § 155
(1944).
11. Ibid.
12. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurmiEs § 205 (4th ed. 1942); 2 SnvMs,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 498 (1936).
13. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 31-42, 113.3, 312, 313. But cf. Powell,
Determinable Fees, 23 COL. L. REv. 207 (1923); Vance, Rights of Reverter and
the Statute Quia Emptores, 36 YALE L.J. 593 (1927). See 1 SimEs, FuTURa
INTERESTS § 178 (1936).
14. 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 178 n.10 (1936) and cases there cited.
15. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 113.3 (4th ed. 1942).
16. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 154 (1944).
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gests that it is not regarded as vested. Is it not the type of interest
which it is the policy and purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities to
restrict-i.e., to strike down contingent interests which may clutter
up the title to real estate and make it unmarketable for a period longer
than lives in being plus twenty-one years? Certainly if such contingent
interests are created in a person other than the grantor in the same
instrument of transfer, they are void as a violation of the Rule.'7 But
the few American Jurisdictions in which the problem has arisen hold
in accord with the instant case that the Rule against Perpetuities
does not apply to either the possibility of reverter or the right of entry
for condition broken.18 In England, the Rule has been applied to de-
clare invalid both a right of entry 9 and a possibility of reverter20 when
the event upon which they are limited may occur beyond the period
of perpetuities.
If possibilities of reverter are not subject to the Rule against Per-
petuities, are they transferable? In a commercial society, it would
seem consistent with the predominant mores that all interests in land
should be considered transferable; and accordingly, by the weight of
modern authority, a possibility of reverter is alienable.21 But if pos-
sibilities of reverter are not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities
like similar contingent interests in persons other than the grantor, and
if the grantor may convey his possibility of reverter to such other
persons with complete immunity from the Rule, is it not anomalous
that a conveyancer may evade the Rule and accomplish by two deeds
that which he could not accomplish by one deed?
While the instant case and the leading case of Yarbrough v. Yar-
brough22 seem to commit Tennessee to this situation, it has recently
been suggested that any court not already committed to exempting
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from the Rule would do
well to follow the English cases which hold those interests subject to
the Rule.2 It is also suggested by the same authorities that a statute
should declare that, if the contingency upon which the right of entry
or the possibility of reverter is to take effect either (a) does not occur
within a stated period of years- say, thirty, or (b) ceases to be of
17. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925). See 6
AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62 (Casner ed. 1952) and cases there cited.
18. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925); 2 SIMEs, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS § 507 (1936) and cases there cited.
19. Re Trustees of Hollis Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540, discussed in GRAY, Op.
cit. supra note 15, § 302.
20. Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (V.C. 1944), discussed
in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62 n.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
21. See Note, Alienability of Future Interests in Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV.
80, 86 -(1951), and note particularly the application of the estoppel doctrine
when the grantor uses a warranty deed to transfer his possibility of reverter.
See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.70 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 SIMEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 715 (1936).
22. 151 Tenr. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925).
23. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 157 (Casner ed. 1952).
1098 [ VOL. 6
FUTURE INTERESTS
any actual or substantial benefit to the party intended to be benefited,
then the determinable fee shall become a fee simple absolute and the
right of entry void. Declaratory judgment procedure is recommended
for determining the latter alternative.24
While this situation can be explained in terms of history, .it is
important to realize that the continued unmarketability of a land title
for several generations can seriously frustrate the normal growth .of
a community in the development and use of its land resources. 26
Private Cemetery Trusts -A Perpetuity: Pope v. Alexander2 in-
volved the applicability of the Rule against Perpetuities to private and
charitable trusts. A testator devised his estate in trust for his widow
for life and upon her death the income to be paid annually to the
trustees of Brown's Church Cemetery Association, who were to use
one-half for the maintenance of Brown's Church Cemetery aid the
other half for the maintenance of a private family cemetery. The
remainder in trust for the private cemetery was held invalid under
the Rule against Perpetuities. However, the Court separated that
part of the gift in favor of the public cemetery and upheld it as within
the charitable trust exception to the Rule.
There is considerable disagreement among the commentators
whether the duration of trusts is limited by the Rule against Perpetui-
ties or by some other rule of law which may adopt the same period.2
However, it is generally agreed that those private trusts which are
called "honorary trusts," such as trusts to maintain tombstones or to
care for specific animals, may not exceed the period of perpetuities in
duration.29 Tennessee courts, like those of most states, have invali-
dated them as perpetuities. 30 Although all interests may vest within
the period of the Rule, if the trust is indestructible for a longer
period, it is a restraint upon alienation which runs afoul of the policy
of the Rule.31 On the other hand, the policy considerations in favor of
aiding charities are regarded as outweighing the policy considerations
against taking property out of commerce, and so the courts- uniformly
treat charitable trusts as an exception. 32 A gift for a private burial lot,
24. Ibid.
25. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY 2120, Introductory Note (1944).
26. See the unfortunate examples discussed in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.62 (Casner ed. 1952).
27. 250 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1952).
28. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 901.1 (4th ed. 1942); KALES,
ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 732-38 (1920); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 553-
56 (1936); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393 (1934);
Morray, The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 44
ILL. L. REV. 467, 468-70 (1949).
29. 6 AviERCicA LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.67 (Casner ed. 1952).
30. Decisions prior to the instant case are Travis v. Randolph, 172 Tenn. 396,
112 S.W.2d 835 (1938); Fite v. Beasley, 80 Tenn. 328 (1883); Hornberger v.
Hornberger, 59 Tenn. 635 (1874).




however, is not considered a gift for a public purpose and thus is not
within the exception.
33
However, a bit of ingenious draftsmanship in the use of an execu-
tory limitation might avoid the result of the instant case and accom-
plish the testator's intention. Under the charitable purpose exception
to the Rule against Perpetuities, a testator may provide that a gift is
to shift from charity A to charity B upon an event which may not
happen within lives in being and twenty-one years.34 Thus, the testa-
tor might have devised the remainder in trust for the trustees of the
public cemetery on the express condition that the trustees care for
both the public and the private cemetery, but, if the trustees should
ever fail to care for the private cemetery, then to another designated
charity.3 As a practical matter, the private burial plot would be cared
for perpetually, although the same result could not be achieved di-
rectly by a trust for the benefit of the private cemetery. The courts
will probably permit this evasion unless the bequest is so small that
the bulk of its income will be consumed in maintaining the private
cemetery.
Shades of Wild's Case: What is the meaning of a deed to "A and his
children"? As will be seen, this is a rather famous question which has
puzzled lawyers and judges for hundreds of years. But in Hutchison V.
Board,36 the Supreme Court had before it a deed to A "and to his law-
ful children born to him now and who shall hereafter be born unto
him after him." Following the description was a statement that "[iut
is my intention herewith to provide for my son . . . and his lawful
children after him." A later clause read: "To have and to hold ... to
the said R. A. Hutchison and his lawful bodily heirs after him heirs
and assigns, forever."
There are three principal alternatives which have traditionally been
presented as possible interpretations of a limitation to "A and his
children." But before discussing them, it would seem appropriate to
make two preliminary points. (1) The Supreme Court in the instant
33. Although the line of distinction is generally drawn between public and
private cemeteries in applying the charitable trust exception, the instant case
illustrates that the distinction may at times be an unreal one, since the testator
and his wife were buried in the public cemetery rather than the private one.
Twelve states have statutes permitting the creation of a perpetual trust to care
for a private burial plot, apparently upon the theory that public policy should
favor the maintenance of all burial grounds whether public or private in
character. The statutes are listed at RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 379, comment
e (1944) and cases are collected in Note, 4 A.L.R. 1127 (1919). For general
annotations upon the subject, see Notes, 15 Ann. Cas. 606 (1910), 37 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 997 (1912), 4 A.L.R. 1124 (1919).
34. Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 2 Sup. Ct. 336, 27 L. Ed. 401 (1882);
McDonogh v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367, 14 L. Ed. 732 (U.S. 1853); Dickenson v.
City of Anna, 310 Ill. 222, 141 N.E. 754, 30 A.L.R. 587 (1923). Other cases are
collected in Note, 30 A.L.R. 594 (1924).
35. This device is suggested at 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 556 (1936).
36. 250 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1952).
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case and other eminent authorities37 are frankly critical of the com-
petency of a conveyancer who would use such a limitation~3 (2) As
will appear later, the solution of this problem in a particular case does
not depend on a rule of law. It is solely a problem of construing the
transferor's intention; and a thorough questioning of the transferor or
prospective testator will normally disclose that he has in mind one of
three plans in speaking of a parent and his children as the trans-
ferees: (a) that A and his children take a fee simple as cotenants;
(b) that A take a life estate, with a remainder to his children as a
class; or (c) that the benefit to the children be what they may be ex-
pected to receive by descent or will from their parent, so that the in-
tention is to transfer to A in fee simple. The moral of these preliminary
points is that one should never describe the beneficiaries of any disposi-
tion of property, either testamentary or by deed, with the words "A and
his children" or phrases which are equivalent.3 9 No matter what one
may conclude that the transferor desires when he states that he wants
to benefit a named person and his children, the accomplishment of his
desires is not assured by such language, and as indicated above, his
intention can be made more explicit.
The three traditional alternatives which have competed for adoption
down through the years as a proper interpretation of the limitation to
"A and his children" are:
(1) The word "children" should be interpreted to mean "heirs
of the body," so that it would be a word of limitation instead of a
word of purchase, and A would receive a fee tail estate. Then
statutes abolishing the fee tail estate would be applied, and under
many of them A would receive a fee simple.40
(2) A and his children should be held to take as cotenants. Un-
der the older law, this cotenancy would be as joint tenants for life.
But under modern statutes abolishing the necessity of using words
of inheritance to create a fee simple4 ' and preferring a tenancy in
common or its legal results,42 A and his children would take a fee
simple as tenants in common.43 A further variation of this alterna-
37. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.28 (Casner ed 1952); 2 SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 402 (1936).
38. The Court said: "The draftsman of the deed in question was most cer-
tainly lacking in knowledge of any of the technical rules of conveyance. Nor
can it be said that he understood the legal effect of the expressions used in
preparing the deed." 250 S.W.2d at 84.
39. 5 A ERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.28 (Casner ed. 1952).
40. Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51, 48 N.E. 630 (1q97); Zeigler v. Love, 185 N.C.
40, 115 S.E. 887 (1923) ; Larew v. Larew, 146 Va. 134, 135 S.E. 819 (1926).
41. TmEN. CODE Aiw . § 7597 (Williams 1934).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7604 (Williams 1934).
43. Livingston v. Livingston, 84 Tenn. 448 (1886); Cannon v. Apperson, 82
Tenn. 553 (1885); Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 (1881); Bunch v. Hardy, 71
Tenn. 543 (1879); Gannaway v. Tarpley, 41 Tenn. 572 (1860); Belote v. White,
39 Tenn. 703 (1859); Norton v. Reed, 42 S.W. 688 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897); Ar-
rington v. Roper, 3 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 572 (1877).
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tive distinguishes between a transfer of an "immediate" or present
possessory interest to A and his children and the transfer of an
interest to become possessory in the future. In the former instance,
children of A born subsequent to the transfer would be excluded. 44
In the latter instance, children born subsequent to the transfer
but prior to the time when the interest becomes possessory would
be included.45
(3) The limitation should be taken to create a life estate in A
with a remainder to his children as a class.
46
In Lord Coke's report of Wild's Case,47 decided in 1599, two proposi-
tions were stated which have become known as the "First Resolution
in Wild's Case" and the "Second Resolution in Wild's Case." According
to the first resolution in Wild's Case, if there is a devise of land "to A
and his children" and A has no children, the language is construed to
create an estate tail in A. According to the second resolution in Wild's
Case, if there is a devise "to A and his children" and A has children,
the language is construed as a gift to A and his children equally as
cotenants.48 Because at common law a fee tail estate could not be cre-
ated in personal property, the first resolution has been generally ap-
plied only to land, whereas the second resolution has been applied to
both land and personal property. While the resolutions speak of
"devises," and some of the older cases make abstract distinctions be-
tween wills and deeds, the distinction would seem to be relevant only
to a normal construction of the transferor's intent.
49
Notwithstanding the fact that the fee tail estate has been abolished
by statute, some state courts still apply the first resolution where A
has no children at the time of the transfer, which would give A a fee
tail, and then apply the statute abolishing the fee tail so as to give a
fee simple estate to A.50 But the Supreme Court of Tennessee has con-
sistently repudiated the first resolution in Wild's Case as a plausible
construction when A has no children, and in the absence of evidence
of a different intent, the Court has preferred to construe the words to
mean that A takes a life estate with a contingent remainder to his
children.51 Another possible construction in this situation would be
that the limitation to "A and his children" creates a transfer to a single
44. Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 (1881).
45. Smith v. Smith, 108 Tenn. 21, 64 S.W. 483 (1901); see generally Casner,
Construction of Gifts "To A and His Children" (Herein the Rule in Wild's
Case), 7 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 438, 465 (1940).
46. Buntin v. Plummer, 164 Tenn. 87, 46 S.W.2d 60 (1932); Scruggs v. May-
berry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S.W: 207 (1916); Turner v. Ivie, 52 Tenn. 222 (1871).
47. 6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1599).
48. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 22.15-22.18 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 401-412 (1936).
49. See Note, 161 A.L.R. 612 (1946).
50. Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51, 48 N.E. 630 (1897); Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C.
40, 115 S.E. 887 (1923); Larew v. Larew, 146 Va. 134, 135 S.E. 819 (1926).
51. See note 46 supra.
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class consisting of A and his children in fee simple and that the class
will be kept open during A's life, because no children of A are in exist-
ence at the time of the transfer. But this construction has not been
followed in the cases.
5 2
The second resolution in Wild's Case- that a limitation to "A and
his children" when A has children at the time of the transfer consti-
tutes A and his children equal cotenants - continues to be widely
followed in the United States5 3 and in Tennessee,54 subject to the
statutory modifications which make unnecessary the use of words of
inheritance to create a fee simple and which prefer the result of a
tenancy in common instead of a joint tenancy.-5
But after all, the second resolution in Wild's Case, like the first, is
only a rule of construction to be applied in the absence of additional
factors which indicate that the transferor intended some other result.
Sometimes the additional factors indicate that the word "children" is
a word of limitation synonymous with the word "heirs," so that an
estate in fee simple is created in the named person.5 6 But more fre-
quently the additional factors justify a conclusion that the named per-
son is to receive only an estate for life with a remainder in his chil-
dren.5 7 In Beecher v. Hicks, the Supreme Court of Tennessee said:
"And a very slight indication of an intention that the children should
not take jointly with the mother will suffice to give the estate to the
mother for life, with remainder to her children, as well in the case of
a deed... as of a will."
58
Thus it appears that there is a strong tendency in Tennessee to con-
strue a limitation to "A and his children" to .create a life estate in A
with a remainder in the children of A, regardless of whether or not A
had children at the time of the transfer, although it is true that, where
A has children at the time of the transfer, and there is not a "slight
indication" of an intent to create a life estate in A and a remainder
52. 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 402 (1936).
53. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.22 (Casner ed. 1952) and cases there
cited; 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 408 (1936) and cases there cited; Note, 161
A.L.R. 612 (1946).
54. Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601 (1947); Livingston v.
Livingston, 84 Tenn. 448 (1886); Cannon v. Apperson, 82 Tenn. 553 (1885);
Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 (1881); Gannaway v. Tarpley, 41 Tenn. 572
(1860); Belote v. White, 39 Tenn. 703 (1859); Norton v. Reed, 42 S.W. 688
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1897); Arrington v. Roper, 3 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 572 (1877).
55. See notes 41 and 42 supra for the Tennessee Code sections.
56. Cf. Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601 (1947); Bowers v.
Bowers, 51 Tenn. 231 (1871). See also Connor v. Gardner, 230 Ill. 558, 82 N.E.
640 (1907); Vaughan v. Vaughan's Ex'x, 97 Va. 322, 33 S.E. 603 (1899).
57. Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W.2d 601 (1947); Blackburn v.
Blackburn, 109 Tenn. 674, 73 S.W. 109 (1903); Cannon v. Apperson, 82 Tenn.
553 (1885); Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207, (1881); Bunch v. Hardy, 71 Tenn.
543 (1879). See also 5 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.24 (Casner ed. 1952).
58. 75 Tenn. 207, 210 (1881). See also Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134,




in the children, there is substantial authority in Tennessee favoring a
construction that a cotenancy is created.
In the light of the vast experience in Tennessee with this unfor-
tunate limitation, and in view of the tendency of the Tennessee courts
to favor a life estate and remainder construction, it is not surprising
that the Court in the instant case of Hutchison v. Board should have de-
cided that the deed created only a life estate in R. A. Hutchison and
that his grantee did not acquire a fee simple.59 The Court attached
particular emphasis to the words "after him" appearing in two places
as substantial evidence of the grantor's intent60 and appropriately
pointed out that "[c]omparing cases and distinguishing them as a
means of finding the intention of the grantor in the case under con-
sideration does not serve a useful purpose."61
The life estate and remainder construction is also significant in that
it keeps the class open for subsequently born children of A. This may
be desirable if A is a young person likely to have more children. But it
should be remembered that this construction makes the title unmarket-
able during A's life. Therefore, if it was not actually intended to bene-
fit children born subsequently, such a construction would indeed be a
burden.
Vested or Contingent- Supplanting and Alternative Limitations -
Implications Based on the "General Plan": More difficult and abstract
were the problems of judicially ascertaining the testator's intention in
the two remaining cases of Long v. Wood 62 and Third National Bank v.
Harrison.63 The Court was called upon in these cases to decide the al-
ways difficult problem of whether a gift of a future interest as de-
scribed in a particular will should be construed as vested subject to
being divested or contingent, with important different legal conse-
quences depending upon this choice. Also involved in this basic prob-
lem were questions concerning the effect to be given to a supplanting
limitation in the form of a gift over,64 and the effect of an alternative
limitation implicit in the phrase "or their heirs" 65 and the over-all
policy question of how far the Court should go to supply by inference
59. The Court went ahead to hold that the grantee of R. A. Hutchison in
possession for more than seven years under a color of title purporting to convey
a fee could nevertheless not acquire title by adverse possession against the
children as remaindermen, since they did not have a right to possession until
the death of the life tenant. This point has been discussed in the Real Property
article appearing in this Survey.
60. Cf. Cooper v. Mitchell Investment Co., 133 Ga. 769, 66 S.E. 1090, 29
L.R.A.(n.s.) 291 (1910).
61. 250 S.W.2d at 85.
62. 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1952).
63. 256 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1953).
64. Long v. Wood, 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1952).
65. Third National Bank v. Harrison, 256 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1953).
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and implication based upon the general testamentary plan 66 that which
the scrivener has left unanswered.
6 7
A careful consideration of the unfortunately drafted will in each of
these cases results in a genuine urge to simply state the facts and
holding in each one and pass them off with the cursory comment that
there is no significant doctrinal development in either. To a large ex-
tent this would be true, and it certainly would be a convenient escape
from the arduous task of facing up to the complex construction prob-
lems almost always implicit in such unfortunate limitations. There
would be good authority for this type of treatment, too! The Supreme
Court in neither case bothered to discuss the relevaht rules of con-
struction as such; and, in view of the comment in Hutchison v. Board
that comparing cases as a means of finding the intention of the trans-
feror in the case under consideration does not serve a useful purpose,68
it might be inferred that the Court is not very interested in them. No
doubt the Court was fully aware of the pull and haul of the relevant
rules of construction implicit in these cases, but simply decided that it
would serve no useful purpose to discuss them. While it is true that
the function of rules of construction is only to serve as an aid in
ascertaining the testator's intention, they do constitute patterns of
legal thought and policy; and as such they are important with respect
to both analysis and advocacy in a given problem. It is not likely,
therefore, that they will be wholly ignored.
Because it is believed that it might be of some interest to the pro-
fession, at least for this first Tennessee Survey, an attempt will be
made to discuss the construction problems implicit in Long v. Wood
and Third National Bank v. Harrison in the light of relevant Tennessee
precedents. While there is frequently a temptation for a commentator
to disagree with the conclusions reached by a court in weighing the
evidence and judicially ascertaining the "testator's intention," like the
typical jury verdict, seldom does one find a court construction which is
not supported by at least "some evidence."
In Long v. Wood,69 a father executed a will three weeks before his
death at a time when his family consisted of his wife and two sons,
seven and nine years of age. The will gave the residue of his estate
to his wife W for life, and at her death the residue was to be placed
in trust for the benefit of the two sons. Each child was to receive equal
portions of the income from the estate until the resident pastors'of
two named churches "shall consider him capable of controlling abso-
lute ownership of his share of [sic] estate, when it shall be given to
66. Cf. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 325 (1950).
67. Long v. Wood, 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1952).
68. 250 S.W.2d at 85.
69. 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1952). For additional comment on this case, see
the Interpretation subsection of the Intestacy section in the article on Wills,
Estates and Trusts appearing in this Survey.
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him outright." Then follow three sentences which form the basis of
the legal controversy.
1. "Should either child die before end of Trust his share shall con-
tinue in trust for his legitimate heirs."
2. "Should he be without legitimate issue then his share reverts to
his brother."
3. "Should both children die before their mother she may dispose
of estate as she sees fit."
Question: What happens if both boys die before their mother, but one
of them leaves a child surviving him?
The plaintiff in Long v. Wood is the child, a grandchild of the tes-
tator, and the defendant is W, the testator's wife. The suit was brought
to construe the will. Should the Court read into the third sentence af-
ter the word "die" the phrase "without surviving issue" and thus
construe the gift over of the future interest to the testator's widow to
be conditioned upon the prior death of both boys without surviving
descendants? The Supreme Court refused to do so and held instead
that "the testator's intention for some undisclosed reason of his own
was not the same in the situation contemplated in the last sentence. '70
Assuming as the Court did that the word "heirs" would be read to
mean issue, descendants or children, the first two sentences make it
clear that, if either one of the boys had predeceased his mother and
left a child surviving, the testator preferred to give the future interest
to the grandchild, leaving W, his wife, to enjoy the estate for life.
It would certainly seem consistent that, if both boys predeceased their
mother and either or both left a child surviving, this fact in and of
itself would not normally cause the testator to want to forsake his
previously expressed preference for the grandchildren. Thus, if the
Court had construed the gift over of the future interest to W to be upon
the condition that both boys should predecease her leaving no issue,
the third sentence would simply complete the cycle of consistent possi-
ble contingencies.
Contracts and deeds are usually bilateral transactions and the trans-
feree is generally bound by the interpretation which he might have
reasonably anticipated from the literal language employed. Construc-
tion in such cases must therefore conform to objective criteria21 But
in the majority of instances future interests are created by donative
unilateral transactions. In such transactions, the task of construction
is primarily concerned with the determination of what disposition was
desired by the transferor; and this in turn depends upon an ascertain-
ment of the transferor's subjective intent, insofar as he had one.7 2 In
70. 253 S.W.2d at 733.
71. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 226-49 (1933).
72. Cf. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 241, comments c and d (1944).
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the performance of this particular task, it is the function of a court
to determine an ultimate issue of fact-the subjective intention of
the transferor -in much the same way that a jury would do so; and
the rules of evidence for jury trials with their policies of exclusion
based upon the assumption of an untrained jury7 3 should not be strictly
applied to hinder the court in the performance of this task. While it is
understandable that a court should be reluctant to indulge in implied
phrases which limit the literal meaning of the words used, neverthe-
less, in construing the language found in a will or other donative uni-
lateral instrument, a court should certainly feel more free to indulge
in those normal inferences which seem to' be fairly implicit in the
general plan of disposition than it would in construing an instrument
resulting from a bilateral transaction.
74
Tennessee courts in the past have implied the gift of a remainder
where the limitation is "to B for life, and if B dies without issue, to C
and his heirs," and B then dies leaving issue. A literal reading of the
words in this limitation would result in a reversion to the transferor's
heirs or residuary devisees. Yet the Tennessee cases have implied the
gift of a remainder to B upon the birth of a child, thus enlarging his
life estate to a defeasible fee,7 5 although most authorities would imply
the gift of a remainder to the children of B upon his death survived
by issue.76 In either case, the gift of a remainder interest which is im-
plied by the court upon the basis of normal inferences resulting from
the general plan of the testator is a much more substantial implication
than would be required to make the will in Long v. Wood logically
consistent.
In reaching the conclusion that it did in the Long case, the Court also
passed upon two propositions, which, while not necessary to the issue
in the case, may be briefly stated.
First, the appellant contended that the death of the two boys before
their mother meant death of such children during the lifetime of the
testator. The Court rejected this construction. This is consistent with
what seem to be well-established rules of construction in Tennessee,
that where there is an immediate gift to B and a gift over upon his
death or death without issue, the reference to his death means the
death of B before the testator. But where there is a postponed gift to
B with a gift over upon his death or death without issue, the reference
to his death as the event for the gift over means either B's death dur-
73. Cf. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy -A Conflict in Theory, 5
VAND. L. REV. 385, 387-398 (1952).
74. Cf. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 325 (1950).
75. Nott v. Fitzgibbon, 107 Tenn. 54, 64 S.W. 26 (1901); Owen v. Hancock, 38
Tenn. 563 (1858).
76. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.34 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 323 (1950); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 272 (1944); 2 SnEs, FUTuRE
INTERESTS §§ 345, 434 (1936).
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ing the intervening life estate or at any time thereafter, as the testator
may indicate.7
Second, the Court construed the remainder to the two boys as con-
tingent rather than vested subject to being divested. Since the real
issue in the case was to define the precise condition upon which the
gift over to W was to become effective, whether or not the remainder
was contingent or vested subject to being divested would seem to be
immaterial. But the Court based its construction upon the fact that a
trust was set up for the boys and they were to receive only the income
until they attained appropriate maturity. "Until that time the child is
the owner of nothing, other than a contingency, except the income.' 7 18
This is contra to the widely recognized rule of construction that an
intermediate gift of the income to the legatee or devisee who is to re-
ceive the ultimate gift on attaining a given age is an important element
tending to show that the gift is vested and not contingent.7 9
The conclusion with respect to Long v. Wood is that the apparent
refusal of the Court to integrate by implication the three sentences in
the will into one coherent plan is somewhat inconsistent with previous
policy decisions in Tennessee in favor of construing the will as a
whole.8 0 Also, the dictum seems inconsistent with the broad basic
policy which prefers a vested construction over a contingent one.81
In Third National Bank v. Harrison,8 2 the testator's will gave the in-
come from his estate to W, his wife, provided she remain unmarried.
If she should marry again, the will provided that the income should be
divided equally between W and the three sons of the testator "during
their lives and at their death to their legal heirs." Then came the fol-
lowing paragraph: "If, however, my wife should remain unmarried
until her death, then at her death the income of my entire estate shall
be divided equally between my three sons, L. B. Askew, Jr., John
Courts Askew, and Harley L. Askew, or their heirs." (emphasis sup-
plied)
The will was executed in 1913, probated in 1927, and W died in 1951
77. Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34, 137 S.W.2d 301 (1940); Hoggatt v.
Clopton, 142 Tenn. 184, 217 S.W. 657 (1919); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145,
180 S.W. 176 (1915); Cook v. Collier, 62 S.W. 658 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1901).
78. 253 S.W.2d at 732.
79. 2 Snms, FuTuRE INTEREST § 356 (1936) and cases there cited. See Under-
wood v. Dismukes, 19 Tenn. 299 (1838); McReynolds v. Graham, 43 S.W. 138
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).
80. Typical of the cases in which Tennessee courts have considered the will
as a whole rather than determine the testator's intention from a separate por-
tion of it are Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34, 137 S.W.2d 301 (1940); Gallo-
way v. Hardison, 166 Tenn. 135, 60 S.W.2d 155 (1933); Hoggatt v. Clopton, 142
Tenn. 184, 217 S.W. 657 (1919); McDonald v. Ledford, 140 Tenn. 471, 205 S.W.
312 (1918); Treanor v. Treanor, 25 Tenn. App. 133, 152 S.W.2d 1038 (M.S.
1941). Also see note 75 supra.
81. Maynor v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 281, 17 S.W.2d 910 (1929); Eager v. McCoy,
143 Tenn. 693, 228 S.W. 709 (1921); Brannon v. Mercer, 138 Tenn. 415, 198 S.W.
253 (1917); Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 39 S.W. 525 (1897).
82. 256 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1953).
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without having remarried. L. B., Jr., and Harley predeceased their
mother, the former leaving a son, L. B., III, who survived W, and the
latter leaving no children, but leaving a will giving his interest to his"
wife, through whom the appellants claimed.
The legal issues were (1) whether the interest of each son should be
construed as a vested remainder subject to being divested or as con-
tingent upon (a) the remarriage of W and (b) the implied condition
of each son surviving W; (2) what is the legal significance of the al-
ternative limitation "or their heirs"; and (3) assuming it is a contin-
gent remainder, at what time will the heirs of a deceased son be de-
termined- at his death, or as if he had died at the death of the life
tenant W?
The Supreme Court held that the interest of each of the three sons
was a contingent remainder subject to a condition precedent of sur-
viving W and that the heirs of the deceased sons would be determined,
not at the time of their deaths, but rather as if both died at the time of
W's death.
83
Whether or not the gift of a remainder as written in a particular will
is intended as a gift to a known person, subject to a condition subse-
quent, or is really a gift to an unknown person upon the happening
of a named event is frequently one of the more difficult problems of
construction. The limitation in this case is a classic example. Tradi-
tionally it has been the policy of the law to prefer a vested construc-
tion,84 and years ago the Supreme Court said that a remainder will be
regarded as vested rather than contingent if "the disposition is so ob-
viously upon the border as to be inherently doubtful between the
two." 85
Suppose the limitation in the instant case had been "the income to W
for life, then to my sons A, B and C or their heirs. But if W should re-
marry the income shall be divided between W, A, B and C in equal
83. This decision affirmed the decree of the chancellor in this case, although
the Court referred to the opinion of the Court in another case involving this
same will in which the chancellor is reported as having construed the will
as a gift in which ". . . the three sons of the testator took an estate in remain-
der which vested at the time of the death of the testator subject to be defeated
or lessened in the event the widow marries." See U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Askew, 183 Tenn. 209, 211, 191 S.W.2d 533, 534 (1946).
84. Taylor v. Dickerson, 167 Tenn. 121, 67 S.W.2d 137 (1934); Maynor v.
Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 281, 17 S.W.2d 910 (1929); Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353,
359, 39 S.W. 525, 526, 38 L.R.A. 679 (1897).
85. Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 359, 39 S.W. 525, 526, 38 L.R.A. 679 (1897).
But unfortunate federal estate tax consequences may follow a determination
that an interest is vested, so that many transferors might well be inclined to
postpone vesting until the time set for enjoyment of the interest in possession.
If the owner of an indefeasibly vested interest dies, such interest is included
in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, whereas, if his interest is
contingent on his survival to the date of distribution to him, his death be-
fore that date eliminates his interest so that it can pass to the alternate takers
without being taxed in his estate. See 44 STAT. 70 (1926), as amended, 26
U.S.C.A. § 811 (1948).
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shares during their lives, and at the death of each his share shall be
paid to his legal heirs." With respect to the first limitation "to W for
'life, then to my sons A, B and C or their heirs," there would seem to be
four possible constructions.
First, a court may construe the word "or" to mean "and" so that the
words "and their heirs" are read as words of limitation and not as
words of gift and A, B and C are held to receive vested remainders.
That is precisely what the Court held in Taylor v. Dickerson,86 constru-
ing the words "or their heirs or assigns" to be needless words of limi-
tation and thus giving the remaindermen described as "my heirs" an
indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple. In the instant case, the
Court cited Taylor v. Dickerson in support of its decision, but in that
case the Court expressly rejected the construction adopted in the in-
stant case upon the ground that the "presumption of law is against
the intention to postpone the vesting of an estate devised. '87
A second alternative is to construe "or" as introducing an alternative
group of takers, but allowing such group to take if, and only if, the
ancestor (e.g., B in our case) dies before the effective date of the instru-
ment.88 Under this view, B's heirs or descendants may take under the
terms of the disposition only if B dies prior to the death of the testator.
This construction would not be consistent with a well-established rule
in Tennessee that, where a postponed gift is conditioned upon death or
death without issue, the reference to a beneficiary's death means his
death either during the life estate or at any time thereafter, as the
testator may indicate, but not death before the testator.89
Thirdly, the limitation could be construed to create a vested remain-
der in the three sons subject to being divested by either the remarriage
of W or the death of either son during the life of W. This would seem
to be plausible and consistent with the broad policy favoring a vested
construction. But it would remain necessary to decide the time when
the identity of the persons to take under the gift over "or their heirs"
would be determined. If the conclusion on that issue is that the "heirs"
of each son are to be determined at the time of his death, this con-
struction would entitle the appellants to at least a part of the share
which would have gone to Harley Askew.
A fourth alternative is to regard the disposition as imposing upon
each son a condition precedent of survival of the termination of the
86. 167 Tenn. 121, 67 S.W.2d 137 (1934). See 1 Snvms, F TuRE INTERESTS § 93
(1936); Note, 128 A.L.R. 306, 325-33 (1940).
87. 167 Tenn. at 123, 67 S.W.2d at 137.
88. Mead v. Close, 115 Conn. 443, 161 Atl. 799 (1932); Matter of Tompkins,
154 N.Y. 634, 49 N.E. 135 (1898). See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.24
(Casner ed. 1952) ; Note, 128 A.L.R. 306, 325-33 (1940).
89. Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34, 137 S.W.2d 301 (1940); see other cases
cited in note 77 supra.
1110 [ VOL. 6
FUTURE INTERESTS
life estate.90 Under this view, if one of the sons dies prior to the ter-
mination of the life estate, his heirs or descendants are substituted in
his place. This is the view which has been adopted in the Restatement
of Property,91 and the decision of the Court in the instant case is con-
sistent with that view and contra to the construction adopted in Taylor
v. Dickerson.
Assuming a construction that alternative contingent remainders
were created by the will, the important problem still remains to de-
termine as to what time the heirs of each deceased son would be de-
termined. If the date of death of each deceased son is the appropriate
time, then Harley's wife would seem to be an heir with respect to
personal property and could pass her interest by will. But if Harley's
heir is to be determined as of the death of the life tenant, his surviving
brother and nephew are his heirs.
When a testamentary gift is made to the "heirs" of a named person,
the usual construction is that the statute of intestate succession will be
applied as of the death of the named person to determine the identity
of those who are to take, unless an intent is found to have the statute
applied as of a different date.92 But there are three Tennessee cases
which have adopted a different rule of construction where there is a
testamentary gift of a life estate and a remainder to the testator's
heirs,9 3 finding that the testator intended for the remaindermen to be
those persons who would have been his heirs if he had died at the time
of the termination of the life estate. While these cases seem to be based
upon the often criticized "divide-and-pay-over" rule,94 and would seem
to be distinguishable from the instant case because the gift here is not
to the heirs of the testator, they nevertheless might be considered as
some authority that Tennessee courts-are not inclined to follow the
more usual rule in other states construing a gift to the "heirs" of a
named person to mean those persons who are his heirs at the time of
his death.95
The contingent construction applied by the Court in the instant case
is consistent with a rule of construction recognized in several states
that a court will have regard for the common desire of men to favor
with their bounty their own blood relatives.96 This preference will
90. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.24 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SnMEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 93 (1936); Note, 128 A.L.R. 306, 335-49 (1940).
91. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252 (1940).
92. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.60 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 308 (1940); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 421 (1936).
93. Felts v. Felts, 188 Tenn. 404, 219 S.W.2d 903 (1949); Forrest v. Porch,
100 Tenn. 391, 45 S.W. 676 (1898); Parrish v. Groomes, 1 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 581
(1874). But cf. Robinson v. Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S.W. 854 (1906).
94. 5 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.21 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 SnmEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 393 (1936).
95. See note 92 supra.
96. In re Peavey's Estate, 144 Minn. 208, 175 N.W. 105, 107 (1919). See 5
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work against a finding that the identity of the persons to take under
a gift of a future interest to "heirs" is to be determined prior to the
time set for enjoyment or possession, because, if the identity is de-
termined prior to enjoyment, the future interest may descend to peo-
ple who are not related by blood to the testator. Such would be the
case where the wife of a named beneficiary is an heir. Whereas, if the
identity of the persons to take remains contingent upon survival of
the life estate, this will normally cause the property to remain among
the blood relatives of the testator.
The Harrison case, like Long v. Wood, indicates a tendency on the
part of the Court to construe as contingent future interests which pre-
vious Tennessee courts and other state courts would probably construe
as vested subject to being divested. The Harrison case also establishes
a precedent contra to the rule of construction followed elsewhere with
respect to determining the identity of the persons who are to receive
a postponed gift to the "heirs" of a named person. But after all, one
might well ponder again the words of Chief Justice Neil in Hutchison
v. Board- that "comparing cases and distinguishing them as a means
of finding the intention of the grantor in the case under consideration
does not serve a useful purpose."98 The lesson from it all is the old, old
story that the intention of the transferor can and should be made more
specific and explicit.
Aa RicAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 21.3 (e), 22.59 (Casner ed. 1952).
97. 250 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1952).
98. 250 S.W.2d at 85.
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